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Abstract. We analyze the structure of equilibria and the price of anarchy in the family
of network creation games considered extensively in the past few years, which attempt to
unify the network design and network routing problems by modeling both creation and
usage costs. In general, the games are played on a host graph, where each node is a selfish
independent agent (player) and each edge has a fixed link creation cost α. Together the
agents create a network (a subgraph of the host graph) while selfishly minimizing the link
creation costs plus the sum of the distances to all other players (usage cost). In this paper,
we pursue two important facets of the network creation game.
First, we study extensively a natural version of the game, called the cooperative model,
where nodes can collaborate and share the cost of creating any edge in the host graph.
We prove the first nontrivial bounds in this model, establishing that the price of anarchy
is polylogarithmic in n for all values of α in complete host graphs. This bound is the first
result of this type for any version of the network creation game; most previous general
upper bounds are polynomial in n. Interestingly, we also show that equilibrium graphs
have polylogarithmic diameter for the most natural range of α (at most npolylg n).
Second, we study the impact of the natural assumption that the host graph is a general
graph, not necessarily complete. This model is a simple example of nonuniform creation
costs among the edges (effectively allowing weights of α and ∞). We prove the first
assemblage of upper and lower bounds for this context, establishing nontrivial tight bounds
for many ranges of α, for both the unilateral and cooperative versions of network creation.
In particular, we establish polynomial lower bounds for both versions and many ranges
of α, even for this simple nonuniform cost model, which sharply contrasts the conjectured
constant bounds for these games in complete (uniform) graphs.
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1. Introduction
A fundamental family of problems at the intersection between computer science and
operations research is network design. This area of research has become increasingly impor-
tant given the continued growth of computer networks such as the Internet. Traditionally,
we want to find a minimum-cost (sub)network that satisfies some specified property such
as k-connectivity or connectivity on terminals (as in the classic Steiner tree problem). This
goal captures the (possibly incremental) creation cost of the network, but does not incor-
porate the cost of actually using the network. In contrast, network routing has the goal of
optimizing the usage cost of the network, but assumes that the network has already been
created.
Network creation games attempt to unify the network design and network routing
problems by modeling both creation and usage costs. In general, the game is played on a
host graph, where each node is an independent agent (player), and the goal is to create a
network from a subgraph of the host graph. Collectively, the nodes decide which edges of
the host graph are worth creating as links in the network. Every link has the same creation
cost α. (Equivalently, links have creation costs of α and ∞, depending on whether they are
edges of the host graph.) In addition to these creation costs, each node incurs a usage cost
equal to the sum of distances to all other nodes in the network. Equivalently, if we divide
the cost (and thus α) by the number n of nodes, the usage cost for each node is its average
distance to all other nodes. (This natural cost model has been used in, e.g., contribution
games and network-formation games.)
There are several versions of the network creation game that vary how links are pur-
chased. In the unilateral model—introduced by Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou,
and Shenker [15]—every node (player) can locally decide to purchase any edge incident to
the node in the host graph, at a cost of α. In the bilateral model—introduced by Corbo
and Parkes [9]—both endpoints of an edge must agree before they can create a link between
them, and the two nodes share the α creation cost equally. In the cooperative model—
introduced by Albers, Eilts, Even-Dar, Mansour, and Roditty [2]—any node can purchase
any amount of any edge in the host graph, and a link gets created when the total purchased
amount is at least α.
To model the dominant behavior of large-scale networking scenarios such as the Internet,
we consider the case where every node (player) selfishly tries to minimize its own creation
and usage cost [18, 15, 2, 9]. This game-theoretic setting naturally leads to the various
kinds of equilibria and the study of their structure. Two frequently considered notions are
Nash equilibrium [24, 25], where no player can change its strategy (which edges to buy)
to locally improve its cost, and strong Nash equilibrium [6, 3, 1], where no coalition of
players can change their collective strategy to locally improve the cost of each player in
the coalition. Nash equilibria capture the combined effect of both selfishness and lack of
coordination, while strong Nash equilibria separates these issues, enabling coordination and
capturing the specific effect of selfishness. However, the notion of strong Nash equilibrium
is extremely restrictive in our context, because all players can simultaneously change their
entire strategies, abusing the local optimality intended by original Nash equilibria, and
effectively forcing globally near-optimal solutions [3].
We consider weaker notions of equilibria, which broadens the scope of equilibria and
therefore strengthens our upper bounds, where players can change their strategy on only a
single edge at a time. In a collaborative equilibrium, even coalitions of players do not wish to
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change their collective strategy on any single edge; this concept is particularly important for
the cooperative network creation game, where multiple players must negotiate their relative
valuations of an edge. (This notion is the natural generalization of pairwise stability from
[9] to arbitrary cost sharing.) Collaborative equilibria are essentially a compromise between
Nash and strong Nash equilibria: they still enable coordination among players and thus
capture the specific effect of selfishness, like strong Nash, yet they consider more local
moves, in the spirit of Nash. In particular, any results about all collaborative equilibria
also apply to all strong Nash equilibria. Collaborative equilibria also make more sense
computationally: players can efficiently detect equilibrium using a simple bidding procedure
(whereas this problem is NP-hard for strong Nash), and the resulting dynamics converge to
such equilibria (see Section 2.2).
The structure of equilibria in network creation games is not very well understood. For
example, Fabrikant et al. [15] conjectured that equilibrium graphs in the unilateral model
were all trees, but this conjecture was disproved by Albers et al. [2]. One particularly
interesting structural feature is whether all equilibrium graphs have small diameter (say,
polylogarithmic), analogous to the small-world phenomenon [19, 14], In the original uni-
lateral version of the problem, the best general lower bound is just a constant and the
best general upper bound is polynomial. A closely related issue is the price of anarchy
[20, 26, 28], that is, the worst possible ratio of the total cost of an equilibrium (found by
independent selfish behavior) and the optimal total cost possible by a centralized solution
(maximizing social welfare). The price of anarchy is a well-studied concept in algorithmic
game theory for problems such as load balancing, routing, and network design; see, e.g.,
[26, 10, 27, 15, 5, 4, 8, 9, 2, 11]. Upper bounds on diameter of equilibrium graphs translate
to approximately equal upper bounds on the price of anarchy, but not necessarily vice versa.
In the unilateral version, for example, there is a general 2O(
√
lgn) upper bound on the price
of anarchy.
Previous work. Network creation games have been studied extensively in the literature
since their introduction in 2003.
For the unilateral version and a complete host graph, Fabrikant et al. [15] prove an upper
bound of O(
√
α) on the price of anarchy for all α. Lin [23] proves that the price of anarchy
is constant for two ranges of α: α = O(
√
n) and α ≥ c n3/2 for some c > 0. Independently,
Albers et al. [2] prove that the price of anarchy is constant for α = O(
√
n), as well as for
the larger range α ≥ 12n⌈lg n⌉. In addition, Albers et al. prove a general upper bound of
15
(
1 + (min{α2n , n
2
α })1/3
)
. The latter bound shows the first sublinear worst-case bound,
O(n1/3), for all α. Demaine et al. [11] prove the first o(nε) upper bound for general α,
namely, 2O(
√
lgn). They also prove a constant upper bound for α = O(n1−ε) for any fixed
ε > 0, and improve the constant upper bound by Albers et al. (with the lead constant of 15)
to 6 for α < (n/2)1/2 and to 4 for α < (n/2)1/3. Andelmen et al. [3] show that, among
strong Nash equilibria, the price of anarchy is at most 2.
For the bilateral version and a complete host graph, Corbo and Parkes [9] prove that
the price of anarchy is between Ω(lgα) and O(min{√α, n/√α). Demaine et al. [11] prove
that the upper bound is tight, establishing the price of anarchy to be Θ(min{√α, n/√α})
in this case.
For the cooperative version and a complete host graph, the only known result is an
upper bound of 15
(
1 + (min{α2n , n
2
α })1/3
)
, proved by Albers et al. [2].
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Other variations of network creation games allow nonuniform interests in connectivity
between nodes [17] and nodes with limited budgets for buying edges [21].
Our results. Our research pursues two important facets of the network creation game.
First, we make an extensive study of a natural version of the game—the cooperative
model—where the only previous results were simple extensions from unilateral analysis.
We substantially improve the bounds in this case, showing that the price of anarchy is
polylogarithmic in n for all values of α in complete graphs. This is the first result of this
type for any version of the network creation game. As mentioned above, this result applies
to both collaborative equilibria and strong Nash equilibria. Interestingly, we also show that
equilibrium graphs have polylogarithmic diameter for the most natural range of α (at most
n polylg n). Note that, because of the locally greedy nature of Nash equilibria, we cannot
use the classic probabilistic spanning (sub)tree embedding machinery of [7, 16, 13] to obtain
polylogarithmic bounds (although this machinery can be applied to approximate the global
social optimum).
Second, we study the impact of the natural assumption that the host graph is a general
graph, not necessarily complete, inspired by practical limitations in constructing network
links. This model is a simple example of nonuniform creation costs among the edges (ef-
fectively allowing weights of α and ∞). Surprisingly, no bounds on the diameter or the
price of anarchy have been proved before in this context. We prove several upper and lower
bounds, establishing nontrivial tight bounds for many ranges of α, for both the unilateral
and cooperative versions. In particular, we establish polynomial lower bounds for both
versions and many ranges of α, even for this simple nonuniform cost model. These results
are particularly interesting because, by contrast, no superconstant lower bound has been
shown for either game in complete (uniform) graphs. Thus, while we believe that the price
of anarchy is polylogarithmic (or even constant) for complete graphs, we show a significant
departure from this behavior in general graphs.
Our proof techniques are most closely related in spirit to “region growing” from ap-
proximation algorithms; see, e.g., [22]. Our general goal is to prove an upper bound on
diameter by way of an upper bound on the expansion of the graph. However, we have not
been able to get such an argument to work directly in general. The main difficulty is that, if
we imagine building a breadth-first-search tree from a node, then connecting that root node
to another node does not necessarily benefit the node much: it may only get closer to a
small fraction of nodes in the BFS subtree. Thus, no node is motivated selfishly to improve
the network, so several nodes must coordinate their changes to make improvements. The
cooperative version of the game gives us some leverage to address this difficulty. We hope
that this approach, particularly the structure we prove of equilibria, will shed some light on
the still-open unilateral version of the game, where the best bounds on the price of anarchy
are Ω(1) and 2O(
√
lgn).
Table 1 summarizes our results. Section 4 proves our polylogarithmic upper bounds
on the price of anarchy for all ranges of α in the cooperative network creation game in
complete graphs. Section 5 considers how the cooperative network creation game differs in
general graphs, and proves our upper bounds for this model. Section 6 extends these results
to apply to the unilateral network creation game in general graphs. Section 7 proves lower
bounds for both the unilateral and cooperative network creation games in general graphs,
which match our upper bounds for some ranges of α.
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α = 0 n n lg0.52 n n lg7.16 n n3/2 n5/3 n2 n2 lg n ∞
Cooperative, complete graph Θ(1) lg3.32 n O
`
lgn+
p
n
α
lg3.58 n
´
Θ(1)
Cooperative, general graph O(α1/3) O(n1/3), Ω(
p
α
n
) Θ(n
2
α
) O
`
n2
α
lg n
´
Θ(1)
Unilateral, general graph O(α1/2) O(n1/2), Ω(α
n
) Θ(n
2
α
) Θ(1)
Table 1: Summary of our bounds on equilibrium diameter and price of anarchy for cooper-
ative network creation in complete graphs, and unilateral and cooperative network
creation in general graphs. For all three of these models, our bounds are strict
improvements over the best previous bounds.
2. Models
In this section, we formally define the different models of the network creation game.
2.1. Unilateral Model
We start with the unilateral model, introduced in [15]. The game is played on a host
graph G = (V,E). Assume V = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We have n players, one per vertex. The
strategy of player i is specified by a subset si of {j : {i, j} ∈ E}, defining the set of neighbors
to which player i creates a link. Thus each player can only create links corresponding to
edges incident to node i in the host graph G Together, let s = 〈s1, s2, . . . , sn〉 denote the
joint strategy of all players.
To define the cost of strategies, we introduce a spanning subgraph Gs of the host
graph G. Namely, Gs has an edge {i, j} ∈ E(G) if either i ∈ sj or j ∈ si. Define dGs(i, j) to
be the distance between vertices i and j in graph Gs. Then the cost incurred by player i is
ci(s) = α |si|+
∑n
j=1 dGs(i, j). The total cost incurred by joint strategy s is c(s) =
∑n
i=1 ci(s).
A (pure) Nash equilibrium is a joint strategy s such that ci(s) ≤ ci(s′) for all joint
strategies s′ that differ from s in only one player i. The price of anarchy is then the
maximum cost of a Nash equilibrium divided by the minimum cost of any joint strategy
(called the social optimum).
2.2. Cooperative Model
Next we turn to the cooperative model, introduced in [15, 2]. Again, the game is
played on a host graph G = (V,E), with one player per vertex. Assume V = {1, 2, . . . , n}
and E = {e1, e2, . . . , e|E|}. Now the strategy of player i is specified by a vector si =
〈s(i, e1), s(i, e2), . . . , s(i, e|E|)〉, where s(i, ej) corresponds to the value that player i is willing
to pay for link ej . Together, s = 〈s1, s2, . . . , sn〉 denotes the strategies of all players.
We define a spanning subgraph Gs = (V,Es) of the host graph G: ej is an edge
of Gs if
∑
i∈V (G) s(i, ej) ≥ α. To make the total cost for an edge ej exactly 0 or α in
all cases, if
∑
i∈V (G) s(i, ej) > α, we uniformly scale the costs to sum to α: s
′(i, ej) =
αs(i, ej)/
∑
k∈V (G) s(k, ej) (Equilibria will always have s = s
′.) Then the cost incurred by
player i is ci(s) =
∑
ej∈Es s
′(i, ej)+
∑n
j=1 dGs(i, j). The total cost incurred by joint strategy
s is c(s) = α |Es|+
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 dGs(i, j).
In this cooperative model, the notion of Nash equilibrium is less natural because it
allows only one player to change strategy, whereas a cooperative purchase in general requires
many players to change their strategy. Therefore we use a stronger notion of equilibrium
that allows coalition among players, inspired by the strong Nash equilibrium of Aumann
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[6], and modeled after the pairwise stability property introduced for the bilateral game
[9]. Namely, a joint strategy s is collaboratively equilibrium if, for any edge e of the host
graph G, for any coalition C ⊆ V , for any joint strategy s′ differing from s in only s′(i, e)
for i ∈ C, some player i ∈ C has ci(s′) > ci(s). Note that any such joint strategy must have
every sum
∑
i∈V (G) s(i, ej) equal to either 0 or α, so we can measure the cost ci(s) in terms
of s(i, ej) instead of s
′(i, ej). The price of anarchy is the maximum cost of a collaborative
equilibrium divided by the minimum cost of any joint strategy (the social optimum).
We can define a simple dynamics for the cooperative network creation game in which
we repeatedly pick a pair of vertices, have all players determine their valuation of an edge
between those vertices (change in ci(s) from addition or removal), and players thereby bid
on the edge and change their strategies. These dynamics always converge to a collaborative
equilibrium because each change decreases the total cost c(s), which is a discrete quantity
in the lattice Z + αZ. Indeed, the system therefore converges after a number of steps
polynomial in n and the smallest integer multiple of α (if one exists). More generally,
we can show an exponential upper bound in terms of just n by observing that the graph
uniquely determines c(s), so we can never repeat a graph by decreasing c(s).
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we define some helpful notation and prove some basic results. Call a
graph Gs corresponding to an equilibrium joint strategy s an equilibrium graph. In such
a graph, let dGs(u, v) be the length of the shortest path from u to v and DistGs(u) be∑
v∈V (Gs) dGs(u, v). Let Nk(u) denote the set of vertices with distance at most k from
vertex u, and let Nk = minv∈G |Nk(v)|. In both the unilateral and cooperative network
creation games, the total cost of a strategy consists of two parts. We refer to the cost of
buying edges as the creation cost and the cost
∑
v∈V (Gs) dGs(u, v) as the usage cost.
First we prove the existence of collaborative equilibria for complete host graphs. Similar
results are known in the unilateral case [15, 3].
Lemma 3.1. In the cooperative network creation game, any complete graph is a collabora-
tive equilibrium for α ≤ 2, and any star graph is a collaborative equilibrium for α ≥ 2.
Next we show that, in the unilateral version, a bound on the usage cost suffices to
bound the total cost of an equilibrium graph Gs, similar to [11, Lemma 1].
Lemma 3.2. The total cost of any equilibrium graph in the unilateral game is at most
αn+ 2
∑
u,v∈V (Gs) dGs(u, v).
Next we prove a more specific bound for the cooperative version, using the following
bound on the number of edges in a graph of large girth:
Lemma 3.3. [12] The number of edges in an n-vertex graph of odd girth g is O(n1+2/(g−1)).
Lemma 3.4. For any integer g, the total cost of any equilibrium graph Gs is at most
αO(n1+2/g) + g
∑
u,v∈V (Gs) dGs(u, v).
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4. Cooperative Version in Complete Graphs
In this section, we study the price of anarchy when any number of players can cooperate
to create any link, and the host graph is the complete graph.
We start with two lemmata that hold for both the unilateral and cooperative versions
of the problem. The first lemma bounds a kind of “doubling radius” of large neighborhoods
around any vertex, which the second lemma uses to bound the usage cost.
Lemma 4.1. [11, Lemma 4] For any vertex u in an equilibrium graph Gs, if |Nk(u)| > n/2,
then |N2k+2α/n(u)| ≥ n.
Lemma 4.2. If we have Nk(u) > n/2 for some vertex u in an equilibrium graph Gs, the
usage cost is at most O(n2k + αn).
Next we show how to improve the bound on “doubling radius” for large neighborhoods
in the cooperative game:
Lemma 4.3. For any vertex u in an equilibrium graph Gs, if |Nk(u)| > n/2, then
|N
2k+4
√
α/n
(u)| ≥ n.
Next we consider what happens with arbitrary neighborhoods, using techniques similar
to [11, Lemma 5].
Lemma 4.4. If |Nk(u)| ≥ Y for every vertex u in an equilibrium graph Gs, then either
|N4k+2(u)| > n/2 for some vertex u or |N5k+3(u)| ≥ Y 2n/α for every vertex u.
Proof. If there is a vertex u with |N4k+2(u)| > n/2, then the claim is obvious. Otherwise,
for every vertex u, |N4k+2(u)| ≤ n/2. Let u be an arbitrary vertex. Let S be the set of
vertices whose distance from u is 4k + 3. We select a subset of S, called center points, by
the following greedy algorithm. We repeatedly select an unmarked vertex z ∈ S as a center
point, mark all unmarked vertices in S whose distance from z is at most 2k, and assign
these vertices to z.
xi
y
S
Ci
xk
Ck
w
x
u
Figure 1: Center points.
Suppose that we select l vertices
x1, x2, . . . , xl as center points. We prove
that l ≥ |Nk(u)|n/α. Let Ci be the ver-
tices in S assigned to xi; see Figure 1. By
construction, S =
⋃l
i=1 Ci. We also assign
each vertex v at distance at least 4k+4 from
u to one of these center points, as follows.
Pick any one shortest path from v to u that
contains some vertex w ∈ S, and assign v
to the same center point as w. This vertex
w is unique in this path because this path
is a shortest path from v to u. Let Ti be
the set of vertices assigned to xi and whose
distance from u is more than 4k + 2. By
construction,
⋃l
i=1 Ti is the set of vertices
at distance more than 4k + 2 from u. The
shortest path from v ∈ Ti to u uses some
vertex w ∈ Ci. For any vertex x whose dis-
tance is at most k from u and for any y ∈ Ti, adding the edge {u, xi} decreases the distance
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between x and y at least 2, because the shortest path from y ∈ Ti to u uses some vertex
w ∈ Ci, as shown in Figure 1. By adding edge {u, xi}, the distance between u and w would
become at most 2k + 1 and the distance between x and w would become at most 3k + 1,
where x is any vertex whose distance from u is at most k. Because the current distance be-
tween x and w is at least 4k+3−k = 3k+3, adding the edge {u, xi} decreases this distance
by at least 2. Consequently the distance between x and any y ∈ Ti decreases by at least 2.
Note that the distance between x and y is at least dGs(u, y) − k, and after adding edge
(u, xi), this distance becomes at most 3k+1+ dGs(w, y) = 3k+1+ dGs(u, y)− dGs(u,w) =
3k + 1 + dGs(u, y)− (4k + 3) = dGs(u, y)− k − 2.
Thus any vertex y ∈ Ti has incentive to pay at least 2 |Nk(u)| for edge {u, xi}. Because
the edge {u, xi} is not in equilibrium, we conclude that α ≥ 2|Ti||Nk(u)|. On the other hand,
|N4k+2(u)| ≤ n/2, so
∑l
i=1 |Ti| ≥ n/2. Therefore, l α ≥ 2|Nk(u)|
∑l
i=1 |Ti| ≥ n|Nk(u)| and
hence l ≥ n|Nk(u)|/α.
According to the greedy algorithm, the distance between any pair of center points is
more than 2k; hence, Nk(xi) ∩ Nk(xj) = ∅ for i 6= j. By the hypothesis of the lemma,
|Nk(xi)| ≥ Y for every vertex xi; hence |
⋃l
i=1 Nk(xi)| =
∑l
i=1 |Nk(xi)| ≥ l Y . For every
i ≤ l, we have dGs(u, xi) = 4k+ 3, so vertex u has a path of length at most 5k +3 to every
vertex whose distance to xi is at most k. Therefore, |N5k+3(u)| ≥ |
⋃l
i=1 Nk(xi)| ≥ l Y ≥
Y n|Nk(u)|/α ≥ Y 2n/α. 2
Now we are ready to prove bounds on the price of anarchy. We start with the case
when α is a bit smaller than n:
Theorem 4.5. For 1 ≤ α < n1−ε, the price of anarchy is at most O(1/ε1+lg 5).
Next we prove a polylogarithmic bound on the price of anarchy when α is close to n.
Theorem 4.6. For α = O(n), the price of anarchy is O(lg1+lg 5 n) and the diameter of any
equilibrium graph is O(lglg 5 n).
Proof. Consider an equilibrium graph Gs. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.5.
Define a1 = max{2, 2α/n} + 1 and ai = 5ai−1 + 3, or equivalently ai = 4a1+320 · 5i − 34 <
a15
i, for all i > 1. By Lemma 4.4, for each i ≥ 1, either N4ai+2(v) > n/2 for some
vertex v or Nai+1 ≥ (n/α)N2ai . Let j be the least number for which |N4aj+2(v)| > n/2
for some vertex v. By this definition, for each i < j, Nai+1 ≥ (n/α)N2ai . Because Na1 >
2max{1, α/n}, we obtain that Nai > 22
i−1
max{1, α/n} for every i ≤ j. On the other
hand, 22
j−1 ≤ 22j−1 max{1, α/n} < Naj ≤ n, so j < lg lg n + 1 and aj < a1 5lg lgn+1 <
(2 + 2α/n + 1 + 1)5 lglg 5 n = 10(2 + α/n) lglg 5 n. Therefore N4·[10(2+α/n) lglg 5 n]+2(v) >
n/2 for some vertex v and using Lemma 4.1, we conclude that the distance of v to all
other vertices is at most 2[40(2 + α/n) lglg 5 n + 2] + 2α/n. Thus the diameter of Gs is
at most O((1 + α/n) lglg 5 n). Setting g = lg n in Lemma 3.4, the cost of Gs is at most
αO(n) + (lg n)O(n2(1 + α/n) lglg 5 n) = O((αn + n2) lg1+lg 5 n). Therefore the price of
anarchy is at most O(lg1+lg 5 n). 2
When α is a bit larger than n, we can obtain a constant bound on the price of anarchy.
First we need a somewhat stronger result on the behavior of neighborhoods:
Lemma 4.7. If |Nk(u)| ≥ Y for every vertex u in an equilibrium graph Gs, then either
|N5k(u)| > n/2 for some vertex u or |N6k+1(u)| ≥ Y 2kn/2α for every vertex u.
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Theorem 4.8. For any α > n, the price of anarchy is O(
√
n/α lg1+lg 6 n) and the diameter
of any equilibrium graph is O(lglg 6 n ·√α/n).
By Theorem 4.8, we conclude the following:
Corollary 4.9. For α = Ω(n lg2+2 lg 6 n) ≈ Ω(n lg7.16 n), the price of anarchy is O(1).
5. Cooperative Version in General Graphs
In this section, we study the price of anarchy when only some links can be created,
e.g., because of physical limitations. In this case, the social optimum is no longer simply a
clique or a star.
We start by bounding the growth of distances from the host graph G to an arbitrary
equilibrium graph Gs:
Lemma 5.1. For any two vertices u and v in any equilibrium graph Gs, dGs(u, v) =
O(dG(u, v) + α
1/3dG(u, v)
2/3).
Proof. Let u = v0, v1, . . . , vk = v be a shortest path in G between u and v, so k = dG(u, v).
Suppose that the distance between v0 and vi in Gs is di, for 0 ≤ i ≤ k. We first prove
that di+1 ≤ di + 1 +
√
9α/di for 0 ≤ i < k. If edge {vi, vi+1} already exists in Gs, the
inequality clearly holds. Otherwise, adding this edge decreases the distance between x and
y by at least di+1−di3 , where x is a vertex whose distance is at most
di+1−di
3 − 1 from vi+1
and y is a vertex in a shortest path from vi to v0. Therefore any vertex x whose distance is
at most di+1−di3 − 1 from vi+1 can pay di+1−di3 di for this edge. Because this edge does not
exist in Gs and because there are at least
di+1−di
3 vertices of distance at most
di+1−di
3 − 1
from vi+1, we conclude that
(
di+1−di
3
)2
di ≤ α. Thus we have di+1 ≤ di + 1 +
√
9α/di for
0 ≤ i < k. Next we prove that di+1 ≤ di + 1 + 5α1/3. If edge {vi, vi+1} already exists
in Gs, the inequality clearly holds. Otherwise, adding this edge decreases the distance
between z and w by at least di+1−di5 , where z and w are two vertices whose distances from
vi+1 and vi, respectively, are less than
di+1−di
5 . There are at least at least
(
di+1−di
5
)2
pair
of vertices like (z,w). Because the edge {vi, vi+1} does not exist in Gs, we conclude that(
di+1−di
5
)3 ≤ α. Therefore di+1 ≤ di + 1 + 5α1/3. Combining these two inequalities, we
obtain di+1 ≤ di + 1 +min{
√
9α/di, 5α
1/3}.
Inductively we prove that dj ≤ 3j + 7α1/3 + 5α1/3j2/3. For j ≤ 2, the inequality is
clear. Now suppose by induction that dj ≤ 3j + 7α1/3 + 5α1/3j2/3. If dj ≤ 2α1/3, we reach
the desired inequality using the inequality dj+1 ≤ dj + 1 + 5α1/3. Otherwise, we know
that dj+1 ≤ dj + 1 +
√
9α/dj = f(dj) and to find the maximum of the function f(dj)
over the domain dj ∈ [2α1/3, j + 7α1/3 + 5α1/3j2/3], we should check f ’s critical points,
including the endpoints of the domain interval and where f ’s derivative is zero. We reach
three values for dj : 2α
1/3, j+7α1/3+5α1/3j2/3, and
(
9α
4
)1/3
. Because the third value is not
in the domain, we just need to check the first two values. The first value is also checked, so
just the second value remains. For the second value, we have dj+1 ≤ dj + 1 +
√
9α/dj ≤
j+7α1/3+5α1/3j2/3+1+
√
9α
j+7α1/3+5α1/3j2/3
≤ j+1+7α1/3+5α1/3j2/3+
√
10α
5α1/3j2/3
≤ j+1+
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7α1/3 +5α1/3j2/3 + α
1/3
√
2
j1/3
. Because (j+1)2/3 − j2/3 = (j+1)2−j2
(j+1)4/3+(j+1)2/3j2/3+j4/3
≥ 2j
3(j+1)4/3
,
we have j+1+7α1/3+5α1/3j2/3+ α
1/3
√
2
j1/3
≤ j+1+7α1/3+5α1/3(j+1)2/3−5α1/3 2j
3(j+1)4/3
+
α1/3
√
2
j1/3
≤ j+1+7α1/3 +5α1/3(j+1)2/3− 10α1/3j
3j4/3
+ α
1/3
√
2
j1/3
≤ j+1+7α1/3 +5α1/3(j+1)2/3.
Note that j + 1 > 2 and dk = dGs(u, v). Therefore dGs(u, v) is at most O(dG(u, v) +
α1/3dG(u, v)
2/3) and the desired inequality is proved. 2
Using this Lemma 5.1, we prove two different bounds relating the sum of all pairwise
distances in the two graphs:
Corollary 5.2. For any equilibrium graph Gs,
∑
u,v∈V (G) dGs(u, v) = O(α
1/3) ·∑
u,v∈V (G) dG(u, v).
Theorem 5.3. For any equilibrium graph Gs,
∑
u,v∈V (G) dGs(u, v) ≤ min{O(n1/3)(αn +∑
u,v∈V (G) dG(u, v)), n
3}.
Now we can bound the price of anarchy for the various ranges of α, combining Corol-
lary 5.2, Theorem 5.3, and Lemma 3.4, with different choices of g.
Theorem 5.4. In the cooperative network creation game in general graphs, the price of
anarchy is at most
(a) O(α1/3) for α < n [g = 6 in Lemma 3.4 and Corollary 5.2],
(b) O(n1/3) for n ≤ α ≤ n5/3 [g = 6 in Lemma 3.4 and Theorem 5.3],
(c) O(n
2
α ) for n
5/3 ≤ α < n2−ε [g = 2/ε in Lemma 3.4 and Theorem 5.3], and
(d) O(n
2
α lg n) for n
2 ≤ α [g = lg n in Lemma 3.4 and Theorem 5.3].
6. Unilateral Version in General Graphs
Next we consider how a general host graph affects the unilateral version of the problem.
Some proofs are similar to proofs for the cooperative version in Section 5 and hence omitted.
Lemma 6.1. For any two vertices u and v in any equilibrium graph Gs, dGs(u, v) =
O(dG(u, v) + α
1/2dG(u, v)
1/2).
Again we relate the sum of all pairwise distances in the two graphs:
Corollary 6.2. For any equilibrium graph Gs,
∑
u,v∈V (G) dGs(u, v) = O(α
1/2) ·∑
u,v∈V (G) DG(u, v).
Theorem 6.3. For any equilibrium graph Gs,
∑
u,v∈V (Gs) dGs(u, v) ≤ min{O(n1/2)(αn +∑
u,v∈V (G) DG(u, v)), n
3}.
To conclude bounds on the price of anarchy, we now use Lemma 3.2 in place of
Lemma 3.4, combined with Corollary 6.2 and Theorem 6.3.
Theorem 6.4. For α ≥ n, the price of anarchy is at most min{O(n1/2), n2α }.
Theorem 6.5. For α < n, the price of anarchy is at most O(α1/2).
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7. Lower Bounds in General Graphs
In this section, we prove polynomial lower bounds on the price of anarchy for general
host graphs, first for the cooperative version and second for the unilateral version.
Theorem 7.1. The price of anarchy in the cooperative game is Ω(min{√αn , n
2
α }).
Qi
P2
P1
P2l
v2i+1
v2i+2
P2i+1
P2i
v2i
v4
Ql
Q1v2
v2l
v3
v1
P3
Qi+1
P2i+2
v2i+3
Figure 2: Lower bound graph.
Proof. For α = O(n) or α = Ω(n2), the claim is clear.
Otherwise, let k =
√
α
12n ≥ 2. Thus k = O(
√
n). We
construct graph Gk,l as follows; see Figure 2. Start with
2l vertices v1, v2, . . . , v2l connected in a cycle. For any 1 ≤
i ≤ 2l, insert a path Pi of k edges between vi and vi+1
(where we define v2l+1 = v1). For any 1 ≤ i ≤ l, insert a
path Qi of k edges between v2i and v2i+2 (where we define
v2l+2 = v2). Therefore there are n = (3k − 1)l vertices and
(3k + 2)l edges in Gk,l, so l = n/(3k − 1).
For simplicity, let G denote Gk,l in the rest of the proof.
Let G1 be a spanning connected subgraph of G that con-
tains exactly one cycle, namely, (v1, v2, . . . , v2l, v1); in other
words, we remove from G exactly one edge from each path
Pi and Qi. Let G2 be a spanning connected subgraph of
G that contains exactly one cycle, formed by the concate-
nation of Q1, Q2, . . . , Ql, and contains none of the edges
{vi, vi+1}, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2l; for example, we remove from G exactly one edge from every P2i
and every edge {vi, vi+1}.
Next we prove that G2 is an equilibrium. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ l, removing any edge of
path Qi increases the distance between its endpoints and at least n/6 vertices by at least
lk
3 ≥ n/6. Because α = o(n2), we have α < n6 n6 , so if we assign this edge to be bought solely
by one of its endpoints, then this owner will not delete the edge. Removing other edges
makes G2 disconnected. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ l, adding an edge of path P2i or path P2i+1 or edge
{v2i, v2i+1} or edge {v2i+1, v2i+2} to G2 decreases only the distances from some vertices of
paths P2i or P2i+1 to the other vertices. There are at most n(2k − 1) such pairs. Adding
such an edge can decrease each of these distance by at most 3k − 1. But we know that
α ≥ 12nk2 > 2n(2k − 1)(3k − 1), so the price of the edge is more than its total benefit
among all nodes, and thus the edge will not be created by any coalition.
The cost of G1 is equal to O(αn+n
2(k+ l)) = O(αn+n2(k+ nk )) and the cost of G2 is
Ω(αn+n2(k+ lk)) = Ω(αn+n3). The cost of the social optimum is at most the cost of G1,
so the price of anarchy is at least Ω( n
3
αn+n3/k+kn2
) = Ω(min{n2α , k, nk }). Because k = O(
√
n),
the price of anarchy is at least Ω(min{n2α , k}) = Ω(min{n
2
α ,
√
α
n}). 2
Theorem 7.2. The price of anarchy in unilateral games is Ω(min{αn , n
2
α }).
The proof uses a construction similar to Theorem 7.1.
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